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Abstract
The appeal of meritocracy is plain to see, because it appears to promote equality of opportu-
nity. However, in this paper we argue that meritocracy is also a deeply elitist project. Firstly,
we place Michael Young in context to show how his critique of meritocracy should be under-
stood as a socialist vision to ameliorate class divides. Secondly, we show how economic
inequality in the UK has not generated systematic resistance: in fact, inequality and belief in
meritocracy have gone hand in hand. Thirdly, we argue that people see their own lives as
meritocratic rather than ascribed, and that such values are deeply embedded in popular life.
We offer two explanations for how such views have come about, and show how they have
helped construct a more unequal society.
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Introduction
THE TERM meritocracy was popularised by
Michael Young’s The Rise of Meritocracy, and
has become an utterly mundane feature of
the political landscape.1 Taken up by power-
ful currents urging for enhanced educational
provision, a more skilled workforce, and the
value of human capital, it also became an
iconic mantra with the rise of equal opportu-
nities and anti-discrimination agendas, in
which recruitment purely on the virtue of
‘merit’ became de rigueur. Arguing against
the principles of meritocracy appeared to
hark back to an ‘old boys club’ of elite net-
works and oligarchic power. It is not inci-
dental that, as Figure 1 shows, the growing
prominence of the term meritocracy in Eng-
lish language books took place at the very
same time that references to plutocracy
declined. Meritocracy thus pitted the brave
new world of talent, individual reward, and
dynamism, against the hidebound world of
the crony establishment.
This emphasis on meritocracy was not rosy
eyed: in its wake it generated a proliferation
of research, emphasising how meritocratic
principles were not in fact being applied.
Much of this research was driven by a concern
to open up opportunities, increase social
mobility and thereby promote equality of
opportunity in line with the egalitarian liberal
political agenda which held sway from the
early 1970s. This agenda united social scien-
tists, who emphasised the need to tackle
ongoing class structural barriers to social
mobility, alongside equal opportunity cam-
paigners, especially around questions of race
and gender, and the numerous campaigners
for educational expansion and enhancement.
The appeal of this meritocratic agenda is
plain to see. However, in this paper we argue
that meritocracy is also a deeply elitist pro-
ject. As has increasingly been demonstrated
by social science research, income and wealth
inequality has increased at the very same
time that meritocracy has been embraced as a
guiding political principle. Beliefs in meritoc-
racy, we show, actually go hand in hand
with greater economic inequality. This is not
just a coincidental association: meritocratic
beliefs are not opposed to inequality—only
to discrimination, which prevents people
with the right ‘merits’ from reaping rewards.
Accordingly, our paper does four things:
firstly, we place Michael Young’s thinking in
context, to show how his belief in meritoc-
racy was associated with a certain kind of
socialist vision which sought to ameliorate
existing class divides, and that his critique of
meritocracy can only be understood in terms
of his socialist perspective. Secondly, we
trace the remarkable co-incidence between
meritocratic beliefs and economic inequality*Both authors contributed equally to this article.
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in the UK—a finding which endorses the
widely held view that structural inequality
has not generated systematic resistance.
Thirdly, we make the stronger claim that
people see their own lives predominantly as
meritocratic rather than ascribed, and hence
that there is a deeper embeddedness of such
values in popular life. We show how such
views can be seen as performative, in that
they justify large economic differentials and
help to construct a more unequal society.
Putting Michael Young in context
Meritocracy is a dystopia, not a utopia. This
is hardly an original observation—indeed it
was precisely the way that Michael Young
introduced the topic in 1958, and something
he reminded us of half a century later:
I could see that equality of opportunity . . .
was itself going to produce greater inequality
and was one of the basic contradictions of
the whole society—all modern societies—be-
cause they all believe in equality to some
extent. I mean, all advanced ones, they all
have some adherence to democracy; one
man, one woman, one vote, et cetera, and
they all believe in equality of opportunity,
which legitimises inequality in a way that
wasn’t possible before the idea of equality of
opportunity as having a great practical rele-
vance to education was very thought out. So
I do think of it as a very deep-lying contra-
diction in society.2
It is often forgotten that his book was an iro-
nic, at times bitter, account of the
inequalities which an insistence on merit—
elicited by testing regimes—would entail.
Young wrote as a socialist, and as someone
who had written extensively about working
class life in London: Family and Kinship
became an iconic—if highly contested—ac-
count of the positive values of working class
sociability and support networks which he
found in Bethnal Green.3 ‘In Family and Kin-
ship, Young and Willmott argued that the
British authorities had failed to recognize
working-class people’s powerful attachment
to place, and to the dense networks of kin-
ship and neighbourliness built up over pre-
ceding generations, which they saw as the
building blocks for a more mutualistic social-
ism’. Historian Jon Lawrence, who has re-
analysed Young’s fieldwork, goes on to
argue that his interpretation of his Bethnal
Green interviews was marked by romanti-
cism and in fact overstates the degree of
neighbourly collectiveness revealed.4 But for
our purposes, it is Young’s vision that we
focus on.
Young’s scepticism about the value of
meritocracy was part of a very significant
intellectual movement which insisted on the
positive values and virtues of working class
life—other notable examples from the same
period being T. H. Marshall’s Citizenship and
Social Class (1950), Richard Hoggart’s Uses of
Literacy (1957), Edward Thompson’s The
Making of the English Working Class (1963),
and Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution
(1961). Young was also in dialogue with
more conservative figures such as the Ameri-
can sociologist Edward Shils—expatriated in
Figure 1: Trend in the words ‘meritocracy’ and ‘plutocracy’ in books published between 1950
and 2000
Source: Google Ngram [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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London and Oxford—who argued that a
modernised British aristocracy such as he
detected in postwar Britain offered the best
prospects for social cohesion.5
Within this context, Young’s project can be
seen as one of socialism based on equalising
national society—improving the vulnerability
of those who were most in need by enhanc-
ing welfare provision, to be funded by those
who were most able to afford to pay higher
taxation. It was in the 1950s that the highest
marginal rates of taxation were exacted in
Britain. As Piketty and his associates have
shown, British rates of taxation of top earn-
ers—which reached a rate of 97 per cent
between 1941 and 1953—were also very high
in international comparison. Between 1975
and 1979, they were higher than those in US,
France and Germany.6 It was entirely in
keeping with the sociological thinking of
Shils and Young that these high rates of tax
could be charged, since the British upper
classes were inherently rooted in Britain.
Because of their traditional ties and responsi-
bilities, they should therefore be expected to
contribute disproportionately to the nation.
We are making these points to emphasise
that Young’s critique of meritocracy cannot
be read as a simplistic conservative tract: it
was based on a specific kind of patrician
socialism that was widely shared amongst
the intellectual left of the time. We do not
wish to defend this perspective, which in
key respects accepted a liberal one-nation
script in which ‘gentlemen were born to
rule’, that workers should be treated with
dignity and respect, and which assumed
conventional gender roles—and as Young’s
later work indicated, might see immigrants
as a threat to the national social fabric.7
However, although Young’s own elitism is
apparent, this does not detract from his
astute analysis of the thoroughgoing elitism
which meritocracy entails. The problem is
twofold. Firstly, the conception that people
can be arrayed according to their ‘merit’ can
itself only be determined by a testing appa-
ratus which will inherently require an elite
infrastructure to determine it (for, as Marx
put it, ‘who will educate the educators?’).
Secondly, awarding unequal incomes accord-
ing to such ‘merit’ both reflects and performs
an economic logic in which income inequal-
ity is not deemed to be a social or political
issue, but a matter of market forces and the
exercise of human capital and talent.
Meritocratic trends in Britain
Looking back at meritocracy, sixty years
after Young talked about it, there appears to
be a clear correlation between the strength-
ening of meritocratic beliefs (Figure 2) and
the rise of income inequality itself (Figure 3).
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Belief in meritocracy over time
Figure 2: Britons’ belief in meritocracy by social class, 1930–20109
Note: The vertical axis gives the approximate percentage of people who think that societal
success is determined by hard work. The horizontal axis gives the year in which respondents
reached adulthood. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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We have examined the trend in responses
to attitudinal questions over an eighty-year
period—focussing on people’s responses to
the statement that ‘success is determined by
hard work’. Data come from the International
Social Survey programme, a widely used
source for scholars of public opinion. Ours is
only one way of measuring meritocratic
beliefs as it does not address ‘talent’, but this
makes it a preferable measure because it
offers the most ‘democratic’ rendering of
meritocracy, since anyone can work hard
(rather than a potentially more elitist reading
in which certain people have more ‘talent’).
Figure 2 breaks down responses by social
class: it shows that there has always been
high support for such a view, with well over
two-thirds of all social classes believing this,
but that this reached a low point of 73 per
cent for the working class, and 83–84 per cent
for the two middle classes among respon-
dents who reached adulthood in the 1980s.
Remarkably, this is the point when, as Atkin-
son and Jenkins’ calculations reveal, income
inequality reached its lowest ever level in the
UK (Figure 3).8 Since 1980, as income
inequality has increased—very markedly in
the 1980s—the belief that success is deter-
mined by hard work has also increased to the
point that it is nearly universal amongst the
working class.
Figure 2 suggests, therefore, that most Bri-
tish people have a different understanding of
the problem of meritocracy than do many
social scientists and politicians. As empha-
sised above, the common refrain of the latter
group is that meritocracy is held back by
various constraints, and that policy interven-
tions are needed to truly bring about meri-
tocracy, whereas in fact most Britons, and
certainly those in the working class, think
that hard work does count. Britons are in no
way unique; research shows that this view is
held by at least two-thirds of citizens in
every country across the West and that as
income inequality rises, citizens are growing
more convinced of the meritocratic nature of
success.10
This argument is underscored by numer-
ous qualitative and case studies. Twenty
years ago Savage discussed what he called
the ‘paradox of class’—that as class inequal-
ity deepens, so apparent class consciousness
declines.12 There is no doubting the extent to
which class inequalities in political align-
ment in Britain, which used to be intense,
have declined.13 One issue which emerges
from qualitative research is the view, follow-
ing the initial lead of Sennett and Cobb, that
this reflects the way that individuals inter-
nalise their own fates—seeing their life
chances not as the product of structural
forces but as due to their own endeavours
and failings.14 Savage called this process the
‘individualisation of class’, in which people
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Income inequality over time
Figure 3: Income inequality in the United Kingdom, 1937–201211
Note. The vertical axis gives the Gini coefficient of income inequality combined from various
sources. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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class conscious terms, but through the par-
ticular lens through which they viewed their
own lives.15 This argument is consistent with
the now widely held view that a ‘new poli-
tics of class’ is emerging in which the
working class and underprivileged groups
do not actively mobilise through political
participation, but drop out and become dis-
engaged. We can consider the contemporary









Figure 4: Visualisations of life trajectory from qualitative interviewees of 1958 birth cohort17
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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considering how people visualise their life
histories.
Meritocracy in everyday life
Meritocratic beliefs are not simply to be
understood as responses to attitudinal sur-
veys, but are also embedded in people’s
own thinking about their lives. This is evi-
dent from qualitative data from the National
Child Development Study (NCDS) which
was carried out between 11 August 2008 and
18 May 2009, when respondents were aged
fifty in the vast majority of cases. Prior to
2008, qualitative methods had only rarely
been applied to cohort members, and this
neglect proved the inspiration for a qualita-
tive ESRC-funded Social Participation study
which sought to conduct detailed qualitative
interviews with a sub-sample of the NCDS.
The analysis we draw on here focusses on a
sub-sample of 220 of the 2008–9 respondents.
All of the selected sub-sample had taken part
in the main quantitative study, with the
qualitative interviews taking place within six
months of an individual’s main age fifty
interview. The interviews were conducted by
a team of researchers led by Jane Elliott at
the Centre for Longitudinal Studies based at
the Institute of Education, with Andrew
Miles, Samantha Parsons and Mike Savage
in the research team.
As part of these qualitative interviews,
respondents were asked: ‘if you had to depict
your life up to now by means of a diagram,
which of these would you choose. If none of
these apply, can you draw a more represen-
tative pattern in the blank box?’ Figure 4
indicates the life diagrams which respon-
dents could choose from and include the
unusually complicated picture that partici-
pant sixty-one chose to draw for herself
(alongside two other diagrams she toyed
with). The figure details the percentage of the
220 participants who chose various of the life
diagrams. Although the exercise does not
specifically ask about social mobility or meri-
tocracy, we can get a strong sense of how
people see their own life trajectories.16 In
what follows we discuss the main patterns
revealed by participants’ pick of one of eight
diagrams they could choose from (67.1 per
cent of participants) or their own drawings
(32.9 per cent).
The most notable finding is people’s
emphasis that they have had an upward life
trajectory, and also their reluctance to pre-
sent their lives in terms of straight lines. Less
than 1 per cent of participants chose a line
pointing downward as best describing their
life trajectory (slide 8). Only 11 per cent of
the sample pick any of the straight line
options, and the joint most popular of these,
slide 4, has a cross in its middle. By contrast,
there is a strong tendency towards jagged,
upwardly pointed life diagrams, echoing the
meritocratic narrative of bridged barriers
and hardships overcome. Over half of partic-
ipants pick one of the two dominant visual
stories: the upward staircase (slide 3; picked
by 26.4 per cent of interviewees) and the zig
zag arrow ending by pointing upwards
(slide 7; 26.8 per cent). These both represent
lives in terms of jags, with a number of
punctuated turning points.
There are no strong gender or social class
differences in the choice of these diagrams.
Men and professionals/managers tend
slightly to prefer slide 3 rather than slide 7,
compared to women and other social classes,
but not to a very marked extent.
As other analyses from the same survey
show, these visualisations indicate that peo-
ple see their own lives as embodying actions
and events which have taken place to or by
themselves and which have had conse-
quences. These individualised narratives are
not opposed to inequality, and in fact can be
deployed to rationalise people’s different sit-
uations in life. There is a sense here, there-
fore, that people have agency over their own
lives and that people’s own actions affect
their fortunes: in this respect they are symp-
tomatic of an internalised meritocratic logic,
rather than representations of structural
forces impinging on people’s lives. This is
true even for those who are amongst the
most precarious and insecure, but who inter-
pret their own lives in terms of the specific
misfortunes which have befallen them.
Conclusions
In this paper we have argued against the
conventional ‘left’ position of embracing
meritocracy as an ideal, and then bemoaning
the fact that in reality meritocratic principles
are not fully applied. Such a framing
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embraces the project of trying to push meri-
tocracy further, by unravelling those remain-
ing corners where meritocracy is kept at bay
by nefarious elite forces. We do not doubt
for one minute that such elitist forces remain
powerful, and indeed they have recently
been exposed by Sam Friedman and Daniel
Laurison in their compelling account of The
Class Ceiling (2019). Nonetheless, an unal-
loyed meritocracy will not tackle inequality.
We see meritocracy itself as the problem
which needs tackling, for the presumption
that mobility should be determined by
‘merit’, ‘talent’ and ‘hard work’ gives no
traction to criticise huge and escalating eco-
nomic inequalities—indeed, it can justify and
legitimate them. Here, we return to the more
collectivist socialist vision of Young and his
contemporaries and emphasise the need to
integrate concerns about equality of opportu-
nity with a concern for equality of outcomes.
In making this argument, we are not sim-
ply speculating, but are drawing on our sus-
tained (quantitative) public opinion data and
our (qualitative) life trajectory visualisations.
Here, we have shown how the power of the
meritocratic narrative, produced and repro-
duced by politicians, moviemakers, as well
as through ordinary people’s stories about
their lives, is as strong as it ever was. People
may have taken notice of news reporting on
inequality and heard scholars, activists, and
politicians express their concerns. Those mes-
sages have, however, failed to resonate with
how people themselves see their lives and
make sense of society. Paradoxically, then,
belief in meritocracy in Britain seems to be
unabated while British society has grown
increasingly unequal. This fact hints that
there is something about unequal societies
that keeps citizens from seeing the full extent
of inequality and reinforces their meritocratic
worldview.
We have already touched on part of what
may explain this paradox: as inequalities
deepen, so does class consciousness.18 The
increased social distance between rich and
poor in unequal societies has a second impli-
cation: it means citizens come to see the
world through the prism of their own socioe-
conomic circles. As people surround them-
selves with friends, partners and colleagues
with a similar level of education and social
class background, they lose sight of the lives
lived under circumstances different from
their own. They normalise the advantages
or disadvantages they share with those
around them. Consequently, citizens of more
unequal societies underestimate the extent of
economic inequalities and underappreciate
the non-meritocratic, structural, forces that
produce, promote, and perpetuate the struc-
tural barriers between rich and poor.19 Elites
fail to feel the following wind of privilege,
and those born into disadvantage are con-
vinced they have themselves to blame for
their inability to overcome the sizeable barri-
ers to social mobility.
Absent serious scrutiny of the elitist foun-
dations of meritocratic ideals and merito-
cratic policy practice, the pursuit of
meritocracy in Britain pulls ever more people
into a rat race; it inevitably entails blaming
the victims of structural inequalities; and it
will further erode social solidarity as equal-
ity and need are abandoned in the search to
reward ‘merit’ in all realms of life.
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